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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
similar rulings in other areas of community life? The Negro
plaintiffs in the present cases relied heavily upon the contention
that the maintenance of separate public schools developed in
Negro children an "inferiority complex." Is this a point of
distinction in regard to cases alleging denial of equal protec-
tion to Negro adults? There is strong support for such an
argument; however, it is difficult to say that the Court will
not extend its views to encompass adults. The only certain
conclusion that can be reached is that the "separate but equal"
doctrine is still valid in regard to every type of state action
not involving the public school system; exactly how long the
weakened doctrine will withstand litigation in the future can-
not be determined now.
Huntington Odom
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT-INTERRUPTION OF
PRESCRIPTION BY PRIOR INDICTMENT
In January 1952 defendant was indicted for manslaughter.
More than a year later, he was indicted again, this time for simple
battery. In the second indictment, the state alleged that the
charge was based on the facts forming the basis of "the indict-
ment heretofore found," reciting the title and docket number of
the prior indictment. Defendant entered a plea of prescription,
which the trial court overruled. The Supreme Court granted
writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. Held, the indict-
ment for simple battery did not negative prescription and was
fatally defective in its failure to state what offense the prior
indictment had charged or to show what disposition had been
made of the prior indictment. State v. Dooley, 223 La. 980, 67
So.2d 558 (1953).
The pertinent provisions of Article 8 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure allow the state a period of one year after receiving
notice of the commission of a crime to file an indictment. If an
indictment or information is filed within that period, prescription
is interrupted.' Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court
has held that where the state seeks to negative prescription by
1. Article 8 further provides that if an indictment or information is
filed, and the state fails to act on this indictment or information for three
years in felony cases or two in others, then the district attorney must enter
a nolle prosequi. See page 196 et seq. supra.
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alleging that an indictment was filed before prescription ran, the
state must go further and specially allege that such indictment
or information was not quashed or dismissed more than one year
before the filing of the present information or indictment. 2 The
court applied that rule in the instant case and held that the
second indictment did not negative prescription because it did
not state "what offense the relator was... charged with [in first
indictment] or what disposition had been made of the case.",
Justice Hawthorne, dissenting, referred to his dissenting opinion
in an earlier case, where he had expressed the view that, if a
second indictment alleged the timely filing of a previous indict-
ment, the defendant should have the burden of showing that
the earlier indictment had been quashed, nolle prosequied, or
otherwise disposed of more than a year prior to the filing of the
second indictment. 4
Finding the indictment defective made it unnecessary for the
court in the instant case to consider the question whether or not
an indictment for manslaughter interrupts the prescription of a
prosecution for simple battery. This question would be deter-
mined by applying that part of Article 8 which allows the state
a period of one year after the dismissal of an indictment to file
another indictment "based on the same facts." Article 8 was
derived from the common law, where the rule is that the new
indictment must charge the same defendant and substantially the
same offense.6 This rule is strictly applied. Courts in other juris-
dictions have held, for instance, that an indictment for "seducing
under pretense of marriage" does not suspend prescription against
a prosecution for "seduction under promise of marriage";6 that a
charge of operating a lottery does not suspend prescription of a
charge of keeping a gaming table;7 and that an indictment for
betting at games played by four persons does not suspend pre-
scription of an indictment for betting at games played by three
persons.8
Under the common law rule, it does not seem that the indict-
ment for manslaughter in the instant case would have interrupted
2. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945). In that case, an infor-
mation filed in October 1936 charged the defendant with burglary committed
in July 1931. It was alleged that an indictment for the crime had been filed
in October 1931, but what happened to the 1931 indictment did not appear.
3. 223 La. 980, 983, 67 So.2d 558, 559 (1953).
4. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 402, 24 So.2d 627, 630 (1945).
5. Note, 90 A.L.R. 452, 461 (1934) collects the cases.
6. Ross v. People, 62 Colo. 193, 162 Pac. 152 (1916).
7. Buckalew v. State, 62 Ala. 334, 34 Am. Rep. 22 (1878).
8. Jester v. State, 14 Ark. 552 (1854).
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prescription of the prosecution for simple battery. It is submitted
that the result would probably be the same in Louisiana, since
manslaughter and simple battery are distinct offenses belonging
to different generic classes.9 This position finds additional sup-
port in Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing
with responsive verdicts, which provides that a verdict of simple
battery is not responsive to an indictment charging man-
slaughter.10
Ronald L. Davis, Jr.
FAMILY LAW-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-
PROOF OF PATERNITY
Plaintiff sued to have the defendant declared the father of
her illegitimate child and to obtain support of the child. Defen-
dant admitted his intimacies with the plaintiff and also admitted
that he had contributed to the support of the child. During the
trial the plaintiff admitted that she had attempted intercourse
with a man other than the defendant. The trial court found that
the plaintiff was not a woman of dissolute manners and held
that since the plaintiff had never had an unlawful connection
with any man other than the defendant her oath was sufficient
to establish the paternity of the child. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The trial court was correct in giving judgment on the basis of
the mother's oath, but should also have held that the defendant's
support of the child, his admission that he might be the father,
and his failure to deny paternity constituted an acknowledgment
of paternity. Rousseau v. Bartell, 224 La. 601, 70 So.2d 394 (1954).
9. For a discussion of the "generic" classification of offenses, see Com-
ment, 5 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 603, 604 (1944).
10. Art. 386, LA. CODE OF CraM. PROC. (1928): "The only responsive verdicts
which may be rendered, and upon which the judge shall charge the jury,
where the indictment charges the following offenses are: . . . Manslaughter:
Guilty as Charged. Not Guilty."
Different considerations are involved in the problem of former jeopardy.
There a distinction is drawn between the situation where two separate
crimes having some common characteristics arise out of the same series of
acts, and where a single criminal act constitutes a violation of two or more
statutes or articles of the Criminal Code. Former jeopardy principles should
bar subsequent action under the latter circumstance but not the former. See
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Criminal
Law and Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 281, 290 (1948). In the instant
case a prosecution or acquittal for manslaughter would definit3ly bar a prose-
cution for the battery.
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